Like that of its Nordic neighbours, the
Norwegian political system features an active and extensive public sector,
a sector which since the 1970s has claimed around 50 per cent of the
country’s gross domestic product (GDP). The main driving force behind
the development of extensive public activities has been the political
authorities’ ambition of developing a strong and universal welfare
state—a welfare state which at the outset was based on a social
democratic foundation, but for most of the time since the end of the
second world war has won the support of all major Norwegian political
parties.
By Tore Hansen
The point of departure for this broad political unanimity on the main
lines of the country’s political development and development of
public policy is found in the common programme which all of the Norwegian
parties supported at the end of the war in 1945. The introduction to this
programme stated that "during the occupation years a strong desire
was manifested to preserve during the reconstruction period the interparty
solidarity and cooperation which has been such a source of strength…"
In addition to demonstrating the political spirit of cooperation
underpinning the normalization of Norwegian society and politics in the
initial years after the war, the common programme also outlined the
overarching goals on which the development of public policy and welfare
programmes were to be based over the course of the following decades.
The ambition of developing a Norwegian welfare state had to a certain
degree a "centrist" point of departure; the objectives were
linked to the shaping of central government policy. In the parties’
common programme from 1945 the municipal sector (local government) or
local democracy is not mentioned as a political player or an
organizational platform for the development of public policy in this area.
Despite this fact it is precisely through municipal activities that
important aspects of the welfare state’s equality goals have been
realized. Concretely, this is evident in the very sharp growth seen in
municipal expenditure—from around eight per cent of GDP in 1945 to
just over 20 per cent today. Considering that the national product has
shown even—and periodically strong—growth during the period,
this means that the municipal sector’s activities have multiplied
since 1945. A concrete illustration of the scope of the present municipal
sector—and this applies to both municipalities (local councils) and
counties—is that one in five Norwegian workers is employed in local
government, and in a number of municipalities the ratio is considerably
higher.
Municipal welfare benefits
With the exception of public social security and pension schemes
administered by the central government, most welfare schemes are
administered at the municipal (local council) and county level,
particularly the direct delivery of welfare services such as health
services, care of the elderly, day-care centres and basic education to the
population. Municipalities and counties account for two-thirds of all
public services. The municipal sector has been accorded main
responsibility for the production of welfare state services, while the
central government administers the transfer of money through the public
pension and social security system. Given the egalitarian ideology behind
Norway’s welfare policy, it can seem somewhat paradoxical that it is
precisely local government that has been given such an important role in
administering welfare schemes, because this is an administrative
responsibility in which the municipalities also enjoy a not unsubstantial
degree of freedom in deciding how the schemes are to be designed in
relation to the local community. The fundamental value on which municipal
institutions rest is independence from central government authorities, an
independence based on general democratic principles, as well as the idea
of allowing elbow room for variation in the policies carried out and the
services offered. To put it another way: while the welfare state
emphasizes national equality, it is the right and opportunity to offer
alternatives that form the core of the basic values on which municipal
self-government rests. In this sense the central government’s welfare
ambitions and goals are somewhat at odds with municipal self-government,
and throughout the postwar period this tension has influenced the reform
processes and measures directed at local government bodies. On this basis,
the question can consequently be asked why the municipalities—and
gradually also the counties—have been assigned such an important
function in the development and operation of the welfare state, in which
the main goal is to promote national equality in the delivery of welfare
benefits. The answer to the question lies first and foremost in the
availability of the services to users, in which geographical distances in
a sparsely populated country require one or another form of diffusion and
local administration of services if the population is to be ensured equal
rights and equal access to benefits. At the same time it concerns the
services which traditionally—although in other forms—have been
provided by municipalities. Local government would to some extent have
been undermined and made redundant if the central government had taken
over responsibility for providing these services. In purely political
terms, any such attempt at centralization would have been a non-starter.
Municipal self-government
In Norwegian politics the concept of municipal self-government is deeply
ingrained. Formally speaking, the present municipal system was established
by the Local Government Act of 1847, which underwent extensive revision in
1993. Even though we have a different and far more extensive municipal
sector than could be imagined by lawmakers in 1837, the formal framework
and systems for local self-government were very much the same at their
introduction around 160 years ago. The basic principle is negatively
delimited self-government, which means that a municipality can undertake
any task except for those explicitly prohibited under national law. The
principle of a negatively delimited area of responsibility is the
cornerstone of the basic values on which municipal self-government rests,
namely independence vis-à-vis central authorities and local choice
in solving problems. In practice, this principle has been undermined
through comprehensive national legislation that requires the municipal
sector to provide such services.
On a more general level the national authorities can at any time
regulate the framework of municipal self-government. In contrast to other
Nordic and most European countries, municipal self-government is not
enshrined in Norway’s constitution, and thus has no constitutional
protection against shifting political demands. The Local Government Act
comprises part of the country’s special legislation, and can be
changed at any time by a majority in the Storting, Norway’s national
assembly. In principle this gives central authorities great influence on
the framework as well as the content of municipal activities. The fact
that Norwegian municipalities are not completely regimented—and in
reality there are great variations in the way the municipalities perform
their duties—is due to several factors, of which two in particular
are mentioned here.
Firstly, Norway has a relatively fragmented municipal structure, in the
sense that there are many municipalities of extremely varying size. Today,
the country is divided into 435 municipalities and 19 counties, the latter
of which have equal standing to the so-called primary municipalities in
terms of their formal frameworks for action. The municipalities vary in
size from under 1,000 to nearly half a million inhabitants. More than half
of Norwegian municipalities have fewer than 5,000 inhabitants, while only
10 municipalities have a population of more than 50,000. There are
substantial differences among Norwegian municipalities with respect to
area, topography, settlement patterns and industrial structure. This
fragmentation and the great disparities make it extremely difficult for
the central government to introduce simple and standardized solutions for
providing welfare state services. The system is dependent on local
adjustments, and such adjustments are normally made far better by
municipal bodies elected by popular vote than by some form of local branch
of the central authorities or field service.
Secondly, political support for municipal institutions runs extremely
deep. The election manifestos or party programmes of the country's leading
political parties contain quite uniform—and sometime panegyric—support
for local self-government. This positive attitude has been reinforced
through the fact that the municipalities have been the main recruitment
channel for the country's political leadership. Looking at the whole
postwar era, 85 per cent of Storting representatives have had experience
from municipal politics. The share is, however, falling—to around 75
per cent today—which may eventually mean some weakening of support
for municipal government as an institution.
On the one hand, this strong political support for the municipalities
has been a precondition for the sharp growth that has taken place in
municipal activities, particularly over the course of the last 40 years.
At the same time it has led to a certain form of conservatism concerning
the willingness to reform municipal institutions in step with new
challenges and requirements. Over the course of the postwar era proposals
for extensive changes in municipal boundaries have been made on two
occasions. Through the first reform proposal, submitted in the mid-1950s,
the number of municipalities was reduced from around 750 to the present
number. The municipal merger proposals were nevertheless never carried out
in line with the main objectives of the proposal makers, namely that no
municipalities should have fewer than 5,000 inhabitants. Even today—40
years later—the realization of this goal is a long way off. A new
proposal for revising the division of municipalities was shelved by the
Storting in the spring of 1996. Other major municipal reform proposals
have suffered the same fate—most recently exemplified by a proposal
to change the municipal income system.
Certain exceptions to this political opposition to municipal sector
reforms exist, and the most obvious exception is the reform of the county
authority in the 1970s. From having played a role as a sort of secondary
municipality—a coordinating and service agency for the primary
municipalities—counties underwent a number of reforms which formally
gave them equal status with the municipalities. Direct elections to county
councils, direct right of taxation and independent responsibility for
providing services within such important fields as the ownership and
operation of hospitals and upper secondary schools were introduced. The
fact that there is currently increasing scepticism—and in part
downright opposition to—the county authority as an independent
administrative level is another matter and will hardly result in any
immediate change in the current situation.
The political mobilization against reforms and other attempts at
central control of local government witnessed on several occasions have
deep political roots in Norwegian society. The antagonism is expressed by
what has been called the territorial fault line in Norwegian politics—a
conflict between the central eastern region (which includes Oslo) and the
rest of the country. The continued strength of this centre v. periphery
conflict was convincingly demonstrated in November 1994 when Norway held a
referendum to decide whether to join the European Union. In all areas
except the central eastern region an overwhelming majority voted against
EU membership.
Political balancing act
The political potential for mobilization inherent in this territorial
fault line means in practice that the central political authorities have
had to practice a balancing act with respect to national and local
interests in the development of public policy. Ideological standpoints and
goals have had to yield to pragmatic considerations in shaping the central
political authorities’ policies vis-à-vis the municipalities.
The central authorities’ general justification for initiating most
comprehensive reforms has been to make the municipalities sufficiently
sustainable in terms of resources so as to ensure reasonably good
provision of services to residents—regardless of place of residence
and based on the fundamental welfare state principle of universal and
equal access to public services. The reforms have also been wrapped in
political rhetoric underlining the importance of strong and robust local
self-government.
The central authorities’ need to exercise political balance in
handling the municipal sector becomes evident not least when you look at
the varying strength of the political parties at the national and local
levels. For long periods of the postwar era the Labour Party was in power
at the central level, even after the party became a minority in the
Storting from the middle of the 1960s. The Labour Party is still the
dominating national party, even though its current status is one of
opposition party to the minority nonsocialist government consisting of the
centrist Christian Democrat, Liberal and Centre parties. However, if you
look at the local level, it is precisely these relatively small centrist
parties that exercise considerable influence, an influence that is
actually far more extensive than their combined national voter support
would indicate. This is connected with the fact that these parties are
strongest in small outlying municipalities, and frequently have a voting
majority in such municipalities. While the three parties have had the
combined voter support of about one-fifth of all votes, their share of
Norway’s mayors (municipal council chairs) is almost double—nearly
40 per cent. The disparity between national voting and local control of
the municipalities has obviously been a factor in stopping attempts at
reforms in the municipal sector. We are talking here about reforms that
can be viewed as centralising and have frequently had the backing of the
Labour Party.
Weakened local independence?
A recurring topic in the debate about municipal self-government in
Norway has been that central government intervention in municipal
operations has in reality deprived municipalities of the independence they
assumed they would have according to the main principles underlying local
government legislation. During the Storting’s discussion of municipal
finances in 1948, one Storting representative complained that "..there
is virtually nothing left for the municipalities to control", a
viewpoint that has been repeated—with little contradiction—to
this day. At the same time the municipal sector has virtually gone through
a transfiguration over the course of these 50 years, which is expressed
not least in the growth in expenditure mentioned earlier in this article.
How real then are claims that municipal independence has become minimal?
Taking a long-term perspective of the Norwegian municipal sector’s
development as our point of departure, the extensive involvement by the
central government in the municipalities is basically a postwar
phenomenon. Over the course of the first 100 years of municipal
self-government the relationship between central government and
municipality was basically characterized by mutual non-interference, a
laissez-faire attitude that held sway until the mid-1930s. It was in the
wake of an extensive municipal debt crisis in the 1920s that the central
government abandoned its laissez-faire policy vis-à-vis the
municipalities in favour of a more interventionist policy. This change
took place rather reluctantly on the part of the central authorities. It
was first and foremost representatives from the municipal sector who put
pressure on the central government to become involved in the operations of
the municipalities, and to assume clear responsibility, not least with
respect to the financial situation of the municipalities. The first and
most important departure from the government’s early policy vis-à-vis
the municipalities came with the introduction of the tax equalization fund
in 1935. Apart from helping to solve purely financial problems facing the
municipalities, the establishment of this fund paved the way towards what
would become a main principle of postwar public policy vis-à-vis
the municipalities, namely equalization and national parity in the
provision of services.
Today we can say that most of the national parity goals concerning
municipal operations have been achieved. Norway’s municipalities have
very few differences in terms of services offered. The question is whether
this standardization also means the complete undermining of the freedom of
municipalities to decide the content of their services. The answer depends
on the perspective used to interpret what has happened. On the one hand
the standardization of services has placed limitations on the options
locally elected officials really have in prioritizing resources, thereby
reducing their independence. On the other hand, the standardization that
has taken place has made municipalities far more responsive to the needs
of the population than was previously the case. In this sense, the claim
can be made that the goal of representative government has by and large
been achieved. The main problem experienced by the majority of Norwegian
municipalities is that central government directives to and requirements
of local governments are not always followed up by the central authorities
through the appropriation of sufficient financial resources for complying
with these directives. Even though financial transfers from the central
government to the municipalities have increased in importance, the main
component of the municipalities’ income is still local, namely the
municipal income tax, a form of taxation that the central government also
regulates through the establishment of maximum tax rates, which make it
impossible for the municipalities to regulate their income level according
to the quantity of their tasks. In this sense, the perception of a lack of
local independence is based mainly on limited financial resources, and
less on the fact that most municipal tasks are regulated through public
legislation.
Major partner
Municipal self-government is still a compelling concept and political
principle in Norway. Throughout the postwar era, the municipal sector has
not only demonstrated its justification and strength as an important part
of the country’s political system. It has also transformed itself in
step with the goals and requirements of the development of a modern
welfare state, without major deterioration of the independence that has
served as the core value of municipal self-government through all time.
What is new is that the municipal sector has been more strongly integrated
into the overall public administration system. The municipalities act as a
major partner of central government authorities rather than playing their
traditional role as populist counterweights to central government power.
It is true that government control of the municipalities has increased in
scope, but at the same time we are seeing a strong increase in the central
government’s dependence on the municipal sector in carrying out its
various tasks and objectives. In this sense the central government is far
more vulnerable to a failure in municipal operations, where alternative
organizational forms to a robust municipal sector do not seem to represent
any realistic possibility today.
Erosion of democracy?
Reductions in municipal independence provide grounds for concern about
the future of municipal self-government. Even more alarming is the low
voter turnout witnessed in the latest municipal elections. While
participation in municipal elections throughout most of the postwar period
hovered between 70 and 80 per cent, turnout in the 1995 local elections
was only 63 per cent. By international standards this is still considered
to be a high turnout; what is worrisome, however, is the steep reduction
over such a relatively short time span. If the decline continues in coming
elections, there is reason to question the municipalities’
traditional status as a pillar of our national democratic system. What is
interesting about this declining interest in voting is that it does not
seem to have any connection with the deterioration of the municipal sector
or the legitimacy of municipal operations. A number of surveys have shown
that popular support for the municipal sector is just as high—and
perhaps higher—than every before. The dwindling voter turnout
therefore seems somewhat paradoxical.
In attempting to explain this trend and paradox, there is much to
indicate that the population increasingly relates to the municipalities as
purely consumers of municipal services, with consumer interests virtually
disconnected from more overarching political or ideological assessments of
the activities of local government. Such consumer-based views of the
municipalities is supported by the standardization of tasks that has taken
place among the country’s municipalities, where it seems to matter
less and less which parties are in power at any given time in the
individual municipality. This weakens the motivation for becoming involved
in politics to preserve one’s interests as a consumer. In the short
term the population’s lack of interest in local political issues can
almost be interpreted as a sign of success with respect to meeting the
requirements and needs of residents for various services.
In the longer term there is nevertheless reason to take this trend
seriously. Low voter turnout weakens the main reason for preserving the
municipal system of government, namely that it strengthens national
democracy. A large municipal sector bereft of popular interest and control
will be a considerable democratic problem. For the time being Norwegian
municipalities are far from this situation, but the signals are cause for
concern.
Tore Hansen (born 1942) is professor of political science at the
University of Oslo and from 1990 to 1995 was dean of the social sciences
faculty. He has published a number of books and articles nationally and
internationally on the subject of local politics, the economics of the
public sector and the welfare state.
Produced by Nytt fra Norge for the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. The author is responsible for the contents of the article.
Reproduction permitted.
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